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W. FRANÇOIS
nothing more in places than a chain of quotations from Augustine’s 
book. Nevertheless, the Louvain theologian seems to be fully aware of 
the two stages of Augustine’s exegesis of 1 John 2,16, which permits 
us to presume that he was well acquainted with the Church Father’s 
work and realm of thought. It is also striking that Hessels refers only 
once to the great medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas, in spite of the 
fact that the Louvain professor was professor royal of Scholastic The 
ology from 1562. The precise date of origin of Hessels’ posthumously 
edited and published Bible commentaries remains a question, although 
it is possible that they stem from the period in which he served as a 
lecturer in Park Abbey.
Wim Fr a n ç o i s
FROM DRIEDO TO BELL ARMINE. 
THE CONCEPT OF PURE NATURE IN THE 16TH 
CENTURY
1. Introduction
In his celebrated collection of historical-critical studies entitled 
Augustinisme et théologie moderne, Henri de Lubac argues that the atten 
tive historian of theology should be able to detect the contours of the the 
ology of the modem period -  i.e. the period from the Council of Trent 
to the Second Vatican Council -  in Leuven’s theology faculty and its 
surroundings prior to the Baius affair1. One of the most important fea 
tures of this modem Catholic theology is its recognition of the existence 
of the possibility of a state of pure nature. The present article will sketch 
the genesis and evolution of the theory of ‘pure nature’ in Leuven2.
Prior to the Second Vatican Council, it was generally accepted 
that the theory of ‘pure nature’ was first formulated by Robert Bel- 
larmine (in his polemic again Michael Baius), from which fact the the 
ory borrows its authority. In the context of the discussion surrounding 
Henri de Lubac’s Surnaturel (1946) and the ‘nouvelle théologie’, 
Pieter Smulders published an article in which he demonstrated that the 
concept of ‘pure nature’ was already to be found among Leuven 
theologians before Baius and likewise before Bellarmine. Smulders
1 H. d e  L u b a c , Augustinisme et théologie moderne (Théologie, 63), Paris, Aubier, 
1965, p. 183: “Dès avant l’affaire baianiste, et dans ce milieu même de Louvain qui 
en fut le théâtre, l’historien averti discerne comme les premiers linéaments de la 
théologie qui devait, jointe à celle de Cajetan et de son école, s’épanouir vers la fin 
du siècle chez Molina, Banez et Suarez. Avec Jean Driedo, avec Ruard Tapper, une 
orientation se dessine”.
2 For the history of the Faculty of Theology in Leuven see the bibliography 
included in: E.J.M . Va n  E i j l  (ed.), Facultas S. Theologiae Lovaniensis 1432-1797. 
Contributions à son histoire (BETL, 45), Leuven, University Press, 1977, supple 
mented more recently by L. K e n is  & M . L a m b e r ig t s  (eds.), L ’Ancienne faculté de 
théologie de Louvain 1432-1797. Bibliographie des années 1977-1992, in M . L a m  
b e r ig t s  (éd.), L ’augustinisme à l ’ancienne faculté de théologie de Louvain (BETL, 
111), Leuven, University Press, 1994, pp. 419-442. A recent overviews of the history 
of the Faculty of Theology up to the eve of the Council of Trent is also found in 
M. Gie l i s , Leuven theologians as opponents of Erasmus and of humanistic theology, 
in, Biblical Humanism and Scholasticism in the Age of Erasmus, ed. by Erika Rum- 
mel, Leiden, Brill (expected winter 2007). Further literature can be found in the bib 
liographies of these documents. For a clear presentation of the various levels of 
appointment as professor at the Faculty of Theology see E .J.M. Va n  E i j l , De theol 
ogische faculteit te Leuven in de XVe en XVle eeuw. Organisatie en opleiding, in V a n  
Eij l  (éd.), Facultas S. Theologiae, pp. 84-102.
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points out, nevertheless, that the Leuven theologians in question main 
tained a different understanding of the concept than that of Cajetan, for 
example. This leads him to a number of theological conclusions, 
among them the belief that de Lubac’s theology does not offer an ade 
quate response to the problems to which ‘modem’ Catholic theology
-  with its various theories of ‘pure nature’ -  had given rise3.
Based on our own research into the available sources and 
accounting for the literature that has appeared since de Lubac and 
Smulders, the goal of this study is to establish a new synthetic 
overview of the genesis and evolution of the theory of ‘pure nature’ 
in 16th century Leuven. We hope to investigate the theological impli 
cations of the latter, such as the condemnation of de Lubac’s theology 
of grace and the discussion it engendered, in later publications.
We will focus our attention in the following pages on three the 
ologians in particular: John Driedo (ca. 1480 -  1535), a representative 
of the generation of polemical theologians who was tutor to the key fig 
ure in the entire story, namely Michael Baius, and may have contributed 
to the form of Augustinianism that was later condemned as Baianism; 
Michael Baius (1513-1589) himself and Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621), 
who taught for a number of years at the Jesuit College in Leuven where 
he became acquainted with the theology of the Leuven School. His 
understanding of nature and grace clearly bear traces of the latter.
2. John Driedo
The theology developed by John Driedo4 on the question of 
grace and nature5 is particularly evident in a work published after his
3 P. Sm u l d e r s , De oorsprong van de theorie der zuivere natuur. Vergeten 
meesters der Leuvense school, in Bijdragen 10 (1949) 105-127.
4 M . GffiLis, Johannes Driedo. Anwalt der Tradition im Streit mit Humanismus 
und Reformation, in M. H. Ju n g  & P. W a l t e r  (eds.), Theologen des 16. Jahrhunderts. 
Humanismus -  Reformation -  Katholische Erneuerung, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 2002, pp. 135-153; R. B a ie r, Driedo(ens) Johannes, in Biographisch- 
Bibliographischen Kirchenlexikon, Bd. XXII (2003), Herzeberg, Spalten, pp. 280-284; 
cf. the website Verlag Traugott Bautz (www.bautz.de~). link Biographisch-Bibli- 
ographischen Kirchenlexikon Online, s.v. ‘Driedo(ens)’, where additional literature can 
be found, in particular W . F ra n ç o is , Augustinus als ‘onweerlegbare vertolker van de 
theologie’. Johannes Driedo over Schrift, Augustinus en de katholieke Traditie (1533), 
in P. V a n  G e e s t  & H. V a n  O o r t  (eds.), Augustiniana Neerlandica. Aspecten van 
Augustinus’ spiritualiteit en haar doorwerking, Leuven, Peeters, 2005, pp. 427-446 on 
Driedo’s Augustinianism.
5 On Driedo’s doctrine of grace in De gratia see M. GffiLis, L ’Augustinisme anti-
érasmien des premiers controversistes de Louvain Jacques Latomus et Jean Driedo,
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death by a colleague at the faculty of theology, Ruard Tapper6: De 
gratia et libero arbitrio. The two-volume publication is polemical in 
character, although the tone it maintains is consistently respectable and 
matter-of-fact. It was written as a refutation of three different here 
sies : Lutheranism7, Pelagianism and Manichaeism. While the fact that 
the lion’s share of the author’s attention is given to the contestation of 
Pelagianism might seem unusual, it is important to remember that the 
alledged heresy in question was not a thing of the past in Driedo’s 
day. On the contrary, he argued that one of his contemporaries, some 
one who had even lived in the same city of Leuven for a time, was a 
defender of Pelagianism, namely Erasmus.
After much hesitation, Erasmus had set about writing a docu 
ment entitled De libero arbitrio8 in which he rejected Luther’s theol 
ogy. The reformer responded with his vehement De servo arbitrio. The 
way in which Erasmus approached free will in his pamphlet, however, 
did not engender immediate enthusiasm among the Leuven theologians, 
the majority of whom had already maintained serious objections to a 
humanistic theology of renewal for a considerable period of time9. It 
would appear from the reports sent by Dirk van Heeze to the Roman 
Curia concerning his mission to silence the theologians of Leuven 
on the question of Erasmus, that the former considered the latter’s
in L a m b e r ig t s  (éd.), L ’augustinisme, pp. 19-61; cf. T. D h a n is , L ’anti-pélagianisme 
dans le De captivitate et redemptione humani generis de Jean Driedo, in Revue d ’his 
toire ecclésiastique 51 (1956) 454-470.
6 P. F ab isch , Ruard Tapper (1487-1559), in E. I s e r lo h  (éd.), Katholische The 
ologen der Reformationszeit, Vol. IV (Katholisches Leben und Kirchenreform im 
Zeitalter der Glaubensspaltung, 47), Münster, Aschendorff, 1987, pp. 58-74.
7 W . F ra n ç o is , The Louvain theologian John Driedo vs. the German Reformer 
Martin Luther. And who could impose their Truth..., in  L. B oeve, M. L am b erig ts , 
T. M e r r ig a n  (eds.), Theology and the Quest for Truth (BETL, 202), Leuven, 2006, 
pp. 31-60
8 For Erasmus’ ideas on free will and his stance on Augustine see: C.P.M . 
B u r g e r , Augustinus’ betekenis voor Erasmus’ opvatting van de vrije wil, in J. V a n  
O o r t  (éd.), De kerkvaders in Reformatie en Nadere Reformatie, Zoetermeer, Boeken 
centrum, 1997, pp. 21-34.
9 E rasm us’ m ost vehem ent critic in  Leuven was the C arm elite N icolaus E gm on- 
danus, w ho spoke o f h im  in  the m ost condescending term s: A n a s ta s e  d e  S t .-P a u l ,  
Baechem d ’Egmond, in DHGE 6 (1954) col. 157-158 and M. O ’R o u rk e  B o y le , Nico- 
laas Baechem, in  P.G. B ie te n h o lz  & T.B. D e u ts c h e r  (eds.), Contemporaries of Eras 
mus. A Biographical Register of the Renaissance and Reformation (Collected W orks 
o f E rasm us), T oronto -  B uffalo  -  London, 1985-87, Vol. I, pp. 81-83. Jacobus L ato  
m us was sim ilarly dedicated in h is rejection o f Erasm us: M. G ielis, Latomus, Jacobus, 
in Nationaal biografisch woordenboek, Vol. 15, B elgian R oyal A cadem y, B russels, 
1996, cols. 425-435. O n the  re la tionsh ip  be tw een  E rasm us and the un iversity  see 
M.A. N a u w e la e r ts ,  De universiteit van Leuven en het Humanisme, in Onze Alma 
Mater 34 (1980) 104-109.
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understanding of free will to be even more heterodox than that of 
Luther10. If one were to follow Erasmus in the opinion that the liberum 
arbitrium is capable of deeds that can bring about its own salvation, 
then God’s grace loses its significance, its primacy and priority. This 
was unacceptable to the Leuven theologians.
Driedo likewise rejected Erasmus’ teaching on free will and 
grace, arguing that it inclined towards Pelagianism. The accusation in 
question turned around the humanist’s recognition of the possibility of 
doing good deeds that have a meritorious character without reference 
to a prior gift of grace11, such that the grace of God is ascribed only a 
limited role. Erasmus believed it was possible for people to acquire sal 
vation without having received grace through the sacraments. Accord 
ing to Driedo, however, it remained a mystery of divine election that 
non-believers and children who had died prior to baptism could not 
acquire eternal salvation, in spite of the fact that they were not per 
sonally responsible for their situation.
2.1. Creation and original sin
Driedo’s identification of Pelagianism in Erasmus’ work cen 
tres around the former’s own understanding of creation and the fall of 
humanity in which the interpretation of Rom. 5,12 played a crucial 
role12. According to Driedo, many theologians were inclined to inter 
pret this verse in a manner that avoided the strict consequences of the 
doctrine of original sin13, objecting to the idea that newborn infants
10 Letters written to Blosius and Giberti: P. Ba l a n , Monumenta Reformationis 
Lutheranae, Regensburg, 1884, p. 552-563; see esp. p. 562: “quae ratio sinat ut falsa 
et peraitiosa [...] non damnentur in Erasmo? Animamus hominem ad scribendum 
contra Lutherum; [...] sed timeo quod longe melius esset eum dehortari ne quicquam 
ultra scriberet, nisi forte omnia sacra et syncera esse credimus quae [...] de libero 
arbitrio [...] scripsisse cernitur”.
11 Deeds that are determinative of the ultimate salvation of the human person, 
and thereby bearing a ‘meritorious’ character, such that the human person can be 
understood as responsible for his or her own salvation.
12 The Vulgate version of this passage reads : “Propterea sicut per unum hominem 
in hunc mundum peccatum intravit et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines per- 
transiit in quo omnes peccaverunt In a slightly contrived interpretation of this 
verse, the word ‘quo’ is understood as relative pronoun referring to Adam, through 
whom sin had come into the world. This was considered to be a strong scriptural argu 
ment in support of the doctrine of original sin. A considerable number of scholastic 
theologians likewise considered the Vulgate’s ‘Poenitentiam agite! ’ (Convert!) to be 
a reference supporting the sacrament of penance.
13 J. Dr ie d o , De gratia et libero arbitrio, f. 103v C -  115v B: “octo difficultates 
ex Paulo de originali peccato”; see esp. f. 103v C: “Amplius autem et hic consy-
derandum, nonnullos solennes esse sacrae theologiae interpretes, tam vetustiores quam
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should be burdened with sin. There can be little doubt that Erasmus 
was among the theologians in question. The latter was unable to detect 
an immediate scriptural foundation for the doctrine of original sin in 
the form of inherited sin in the Romans text. For Erasmus, the sin of 
contemporary men and woman was more of an ‘imitation’ of Adam’s 
first sin. Driedo could not have disagreed more. Adam’s sin had caused 
the fall of all humanity. Everyone was thus bom ‘in a state of sin’ and 
in need of Christ’s redemptive grace to achieve his or her original state 
of righteousness anew.
The differences between Driedo’s perspective and that of Eras 
mus become all the more evident when one examines their different 
notions of concupiscentia. Driedo insists that many theologian of his 
day followed Pelagius by approaching concupiscence as a natural phe 
nomenon and not as having its roots in original sin14. He quotes one of 
Erasmus’ early works -  the Encomium matrimonii published in Leuven 
by Dirk Martens in 1518 -  word for word without making reference to 
his specific source, although he does make explicit use of Erasmus’ 
name, an otherwise singular event in the Leuven theologian’s extensive
huius temporis, qui locum hunc Apostoli ita interpretantur, quod ex eodem concludi 
non possit, parvulum mox natum, ullum habere peccatum, aut nasci in ira et indigna 
tione divina, [...]” ; f. 104v A: “Similibus quoque interpretationibus innixi sunt non- 
nuli huius temporis interpretes qui aut carpunt aut silentio praetereunt interpretationem 
[...] patrum [...] qui interpretantur Apostolum in hoc loco loqui de propagatione [...] 
peccati” ; f. 104v C: “[...] nonnulli sic interpretantur, ut ex hac Apostoli doctrina ad 
illorum mentem interpretata, non relinquatur locus probandi ullum esse in parvulis 
originale peccatum”; f. 116r A: “[...] vulpes subintroierunt in Dei Ecclesiam, quae 
variis et peregrinis interpretationibus demoliuntur vineas, scripturas sacras adulter 
antes, et antiquas haereses rénovantes, que et supradicta scripturae testimonia alior 
sum ita interpretantur, ut ex eis prorsus fundari non possit ullum esse in parvulis orig 
inale peccatum [...]”; f. 121r B: “Hanc quoque Pelagii interpretationem imitati sunt 
qui hoc tempore putantur solennes sacrae scripturae interpretes, volentes forsitan occul 
tas haereses seminare de parvulis non baptizandis”.
14 D r ie d o , De gratia, f. 162r A -  B : “Et hanc sententiam visi sunt approbare qui 
dam huius temporis amatores voluptatis, ac etiam novarum rerum inventores, qui sin 
gularitate scientiae gaudentes perturbant omnia, quae tradidit nobis veneranda anti 
quitas, censentes camis nostrae pruriginem, Venerisque stimulos a natura, non a 
peccato proficisci, quibusdam moti rationibus: ‘Primum, quod neque Deus neque 
natura quicquam faciunt frustra. Deus genitale membrum condidit, et vim gignendi 
addidit. Deinde matrimoni opus sub innocentiae statu seu ante culpam, sine his stimulis 
peragi non potuit [...] Amplius autem, et in caeteris animantibus tales stimuli a natura, 
non a peccato proficiscuntur. Postremo addunt, nos huiuscemodi prurigines camis 
nostrae reddere imaginatione nostra foedas, quae suapte natura pulchrae sunt et hones 
tae”. Cf. f. 132r D. “Argumenta vero solutionesque eorum, quibus haeretici conantur 
probare, concupiscentiam camis, stimulum Veneris, seu pruriginem libidinis, esse 
naturale bonum; infra patebunt in secundo tractatu libri secundi”.
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writings15. According to Erasmus, the sexual instincts of the human 
person continued to be good in themselves, even after the fall16. Eras 
mus’ line of reasoning harks back to the ancient idea that God never 
does anything by mistake: if God created the human person with gen 
ital organs, it goes without saying that the latter also have a purpose. 
Driedo was inclined to follow Augustine’s argumentation in this regard, 
however, maintaining that concupiscentia was one of the negative con 
sequences of the fall, a characteristic of the corrupt state of human 
nature when it is deprived of grace. For Driedo, the phenomenon is 
thus essentially evil and he refers to it explicitly as ‘evil’ concupis 
cence, in spite of the fact that Augustine recognised the positive use 
thereof, namely in the context of marriage and procreation17. Driedo’s 
doctrine of grace, together with his idea of ‘pure nature’, must be under 
stood nevertheless against the background of his teaching on creation 
and the fall.
2.2. The Doctrine o f Grace
a. Historical-theological backgrounds: From the Doctor Gratiae to the
Doctor Angelicus
As most theologians in this controversy tend to do, Driedo refers 
to the works of Augustine in virtually every part of his argument.
15 D r j e d o , De gratia, f. 166v D -  167r A.: “Ad ea quae ad roborandum Pelagii 
heresim adiiciuntur in argumentis ex sententia Erasmi docentis, pruriginem camis 
stimulosque Veneris non a peccate, sed a natura proficisci, facilis ets responsio
16 D. E ra sm u s , Encomium matrimonii, ed. J.-C. M a r g o l in ,  in Opera omnia 
Desiderii Erasmi Roterdami, t. I, 5, Amsterdam-Oxford, North-Holland Publishing 
Company, 1975,p. 398-400,1. 183-186 and 190-195: “[...] si merito, velut adagionis 
vice ubique decantatum, neque deum neque naturam quicquam frustra facere, cur haec 
membra tribuit, cur hos stimulos, hanc gignendi vim addidit, si coelibatus laudi duci 
tur? [...] Nec audio qui mihi dicat foedam illam pruriginem et Veneris stimulos non 
a natura, sed peccato profectam. Quid tam dissimile veri? Quasi vero matrimonium, 
cuius munus sine his stimulis peragi nequit, non culpam precesserit. Iam in caeteris 
animantibus unde illi stimuli? an a natura an peccato? Mirum ni a natura. Postremo 
nos imaginatione foedum reddimus, quod suapte natura pulchrum ac sanctum est”. 
Cf. D. E rasm u s , Apologia pro declamatione matrimonii, in E rasm u s , Opera omnia, 
Leiden, 1706, c. 109 C: “ ... rationibus undique petitis rem ago, quod genus est illud, 
quod alicubi dictum, stimulos gignendi non a peccato, sed a natura profectos, cum 
agatur de iis stimulis, qui rationi non repugnant”.
17 Augustine did not deem ‘concupiscentia’ to be a serious sin, but considered it
rather as a ‘peccatum veniale’, see M. L a m b e r ig t s , A Critical Evaluation of Critiques
of Augustine’s View of Sexuality, in R. D o d a r o  & G. L a w l e s s  (eds.), Augustine and
his Critics. Essays in honour of Gerald Bonner, Londen, New York, NY, Routledge,
2000, pp. 176-197.Cfr. G. B o n n e r , Concupiscentia, in C. M a y e r  (ed.), Augustinus-
Lexikon. Vol. 1 : Aaron-Conuersio, Basel, Schwabe & co., 1986-1994, cols. 1113-1122.
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Augustine’s basic idea can be summarised as follows: the human per 
son originally enjoyed a positive relationship with the creator, but 
because of original sin, humanity as a whole has been confronted with 
the loss of the state it once had in paradise (natura vitiata). This 
implies that generation after generation is bom in a state of sin, and 
that the human person is incapable of achieving the good unaided18. 
Human free will is not enough to allow human persons to live accord 
ing to the commandments of God since it is likewise obscured by the 
power of sin. God sent His Son, however, to liberate humanity by 
offering them his redemptive grace19. The source of every misfortune 
is the hold exerted by original sin on humanity. A consequence of this 
conviction is the absolute necessity of baptising children to save them 
for eternal life in the event that they should die a premature death20.
This theology of grace is further specified in the scholastic 
period by Thomas Aquinas, among others21. For Thomas, the deeds of 
those who have acquired a state of grace through baptism and have 
been influenced by the liberum arbitrium are ‘de condigno’ meritori 
ous deeds22. Other medieval theologians gave more credit to fallen 
humanity than Thomas was inclined to do. Thinkers such as William 
of Ockham and the Nominalist School recognised that the human per 
son had the ability to perform deeds with a positive moral character 
under their own steam as it were, deeds that were also meritorious 
from the viewpoint of salvation. In contrast to Augustine, Thomas 
Aquinas was prepared to accept that the human person was capable of 
morally good deeds in spite of his or her fallen state, still he refused 
to accept the suggestion that such deeds were meritorious when it came 
to eternal salvation. This ultimately implied that the human person was 
unable to bring about his or her own salvation, and Thomas main 
tained an opposition between the natural order and the order of grace23.
18 Cfr. the debate with Julian of Aeclanum, M. L a m b e r ig t s , Iulianus IV (lulianus 
von Aeclanum), in Realenzyklopàdie fur Antike und Christentum 19 (1999), 483-505.
19 V.H. Dr e c o l l , Gratia, in C.P. M a y e r  (ed.), Augustinus-Lexikon, Vol. 3, Basel, 
Schwabe, cols. 182-242.
20 W. H a r m l e s s , Baptism, in A.D. Fit z g e r a l d , Augustine through the Ages, 
Eerdmans, Grand Rapids MI & Cambridge, 1999, pp. 84-91
21 See a.o. J.B. K o r s , La justice primitive et le péché originel d ’après S. Thomas. 
Les sources. La doctrine (Bibliothèque thomiste, 2), Kain, 1922.
22 Later theologians (especially during the period of baroque scholasticism) 
insisted, however, that even those in a state of grace were in need of actual or imme 
diate grace (‘gratia cooperans’) in order to avoid sin.
23 A. Va n n e s t e , Le 'De primi hominis justitia’ de Baius, in LAMBERIGTS (ed.), 
L ’augustinisme, pp. 123-166.
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The Nominalist School, on the other hand, maintained that the person 
who did everything in his or her power to live an ethical life based on 
equity and reasonableness could contribute positively to his or her own 
salvation. Such a life was understood as meritorious ‘de congruo’. At 
the level of the doctrine of predestination, this lead to the notion of 
‘praedestinatio post praevisa merita’ : thanks to divine prescient 
knowledge, God is aware of the potential merits of the human person 
(ascribed exclusively to his or her moral activities) and is thus able to 
grant the said individual his grace and favour a positive ‘salvific’ pre 
destination.
Erasmus’ thinking in this regard can be understood in line with 
that of Nominalist theology24. Bearing in mind that he limited the influ 
ence of original sin to an occasional and individual inclination to sin, 
it remained possible for human persons to cooperate in bringing about 
their own salvation on the basis of their morally correct deeds. This 
implied that a non-believer who had remained faithful to the natural 
law was capable of performing meritorious deeds without being aware 
of it.
b. Grace versus moral deeds
The Nominalist/Erasmian line of argument places a logical 
emphasis on the personal responsibility of the human person for his or 
her own salvation. Driedo, however, sternly rejects this rather moral 
istic vision of the Christian life. If one is to take the fall seriously, he 
claims, it makes no sense to argue that fallen humanity is capable of 
earning salvation on the basis of its own deeds. The theology of cre 
ation lies at the heart of Driedo’s doctrine of grace. At the moment of 
creation, the human person was given both reason and a liberum arbi 
trium. Furthermore, in the paradisiacal state, the human person had 
received the gift of grace and was free from concupiscentia. Accord 
ing to Driedo, the true nature of the human person prior to the fall was
24 It should be  noted  in  this regard that the ‘sources’ o f  E rasm us thought are the
focus o f  considerable debate. A uthors such as B ouw sm a, fo r exam ple, are inclined to
d escribe  his thought as a  renaissance-like neo-sto ic ism  (W .J. B o u w s m a , The Two 
Faces of Humanism. Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought, in 
H .A . O b e r m a n n  & T.A. B r a d y  (eds.), Itinerarium Italicum. The Profile of the Ital 
ian Renaissance in the Mirror of Its European Transformations. Dedicated to P.O. 
Kristeller on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday (Studies in M edieval and R eform a 
tion  Thought, 14), Leiden, Brill, 1975, pp. 3-60), w hile B urger insists on the influence 
o f  H ugolinus o f  O rvieto  (C .M . B u r g e r , De receptie van Augustinus’ genadeleer. 
Gregorius van Rimini, Hugolinus van Orvieto, Erasmus en Luther (tot 1518), in  v a n  
Ge e s t  & v a n  O o r t  (eds.) Augustiniana Neerlandica, pp. 420-422).
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one of intactness and integrity, free from negative concupiscentia, free 
from suffering and death. After the fall, however, humanity was sub 
ject to sin and human persons were “natura filii irae”25 As far as he 
is concerned, therefore, humanity’s originally good nature had been 
corrupted and this had two primary implications : the loss of human 
ity’s originally righteous state and the loss of the positive orientation 
of the will towards God. After the fall, humanity was inclined to evil, 
and this could only be undone by Christ’s gift of grace.
According to Driedo, the loss of the state of righteousness like 
wise deprived human persons of the possibility of performing good 
works since a good work is a gift of God. This position is quite under 
standable when we bear in mind that original sin for Driedo deter 
mines everything. For this reason, Driedo prefers to speak of fallen 
humanity rather than fallen human beings in the individual sense. 
Being part of humanity as a collective implies being bom ipso facto 
in a state o f sin. It makes no difference if the individual has sinned 
under the influence of his or her own will. It is of primary importance 
to realise that God’s wrath rests on all human persons, in spite of the 
fact that an individual person may not have sinned by his or her own 
free will. In Driedo’s opinion, human nature had been corrupted by 
original sin to such an extent that even the possibility of acting morally 
had been undermined. Where Thomas was able to accept that fallen 
men and women were capable of performing morally correct deeds, 
albeit without salvific value, Driedo takes matters a step further. The 
‘yet to be justified’ human person was so corrupt that the performance 
of morally correct deeds had become transparently impossible26. While 
there can be little doubt that Thomas and Driedo oppose one another 
in this regard, the latter’s opposition to the Ockhamist tradition and 
Erasmus is even more manifest27. A discussion of the correctness of 
Driedo’s interpretation of Augustine’s vision of morality would take
25 D rie d o , De gratia, f. 79v C-D: “Homo iam post lapsum Ade filius irae natus, 
et in peccato conceptus” ; f. 119v B: “Caput [...], in quo [...] demonstratur, parvu 
los nasci filios irae, vinculo damnationis obstrictos”. The terminology here is bor 
rowed from Ef. 2,3. It is interesting to note that the expression is also found in the 
Decretum de iustificatione, Cap.l dated January 13th 1547, from the sixth session of 
the Council of Trent. See Denz. 793.
26 D rie d o , De gratia, f. 164v B : “Aristoteles ceterique philosophi ignorantes Dei 
iustitiam, veram iustitiam a peccato liberantem et gratificantem ad vitam aeternam, non 
sunt assequuti et idcirco aliter docet fides Christiana”. In the margins: “Iustitia Dei 
longe diversa a iustitia morali”.
27 Both the Nominalists and Erasmus recognised the possibility that unjustified 
people could perform meritorious deeds. This moralistic vision was not at home among 
Driedo’s Augustinian ideas.
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us beyond the boundaries of the present contribution. It is important 
to note, nevertheless, that Driedo considered himself to be supported 
by the doctor gratiae.
2.3. Driedo and pur a natura
The concept of pure nature stemming from the theology of the 
16th century is both well-known and disputed in equal measure. The 
concept takes its point of departure from the following question: could 
God have created humanity in an exclusively natural order, in which 
it was not destined to live according to the gift of grace and look for 
ward to the ultimate beatific vision of God, but limited rather to a 
merely immanent finality? Some theologians were inclined to respond 
to this question by positing the existence of two strictly distinct final 
ities with respect to human existence: a natural finality on the one 
hand, in proportion to the capacities of human nature, considered pure 
in itself and thus detached from the human person’s need for grace 
(brought abut by original sin), and a supernatural finality on the other 
hand, which presupposes a free enhancement of human nature.
The development of this idea ran counter to the medieval notion 
that the single finality was to be found in the final visio beatifica -  
based on the desiderium naturale. The proposed separation of finalities 
ascribed two different states to humanity, which were related to one 
another in a hierarchical way. This tradition has clear roots in Caje- 
tan’s idea if a division between the order of natural morality and the 
order of grace. According to a broadly accepted hypothesis, maintained 
into the middle of the last century, the first to make mention of a natura 
pura was Robert Bellarmine in the context of his dispute with Baius.
To what extent did Driedo already maintain a notion of pur a 
natural In order to answer this question we return to his theology of 
creation in which he inquires inductively whether God should not be 
considered unjust when he condemns human beings for a fault they 
themselves did not commit. He responds to his own question -  modo 
hypothetico -  by noting that God could have created without original 
justice, and thus without the right to the visio beatifica28. In other
28 D ried o , De gratia, f. 119v A: “Quod si Deus primum hominem talem con 
didisset qualis nunc est, id est, mortalem, secundum carnem pronum concupiscere
adversus spiritum, et non praeditum originali iustitia, qua tenerent omnia sub suo 
dominio, tunc in eo carentia originalis iustitiae nulla esset culpa: quia non esset illa 
carentia tum facta ulla transgressione voluntaria”. A parallel text can be found in 
another of his works: D r ie d o , De concordia, f. 13v D -  14r B; for the text see 
Sm u l d e r s , Oorsprong, p. 113 and d e  L u b a c , Augustinisme, p. 184.
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words, God could have created human beings according to a com 
pletely different order than he de facto did, i.e. in a state of immedi 
ate fallenness. Such an ‘unfallen’ human state would imply that there 
was no prior violation of God’s commandment. Driedo makes refer 
ence to the possibility of a pure natural order in De gratia et libero 
arbitrio as well as De concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis29.
By hypothesising a creation of humanity according to a purely 
natural order, Driedo was endeavouring to solve a problem that was 
close to his heart, namely the fate of the multitudes of people who had 
never been given the chance to become Christian and receive baptism. 
The problem in question was raised by a number of theologians of the 
‘via modema’ and by humanists such as Erasmus. They asked them 
selves whether God should not be consider unjust when he punishes 
people for a sin they did not commit, a sin committed in fact by their 
forefather Adam. Driedo’s hypothesis of a creation of humanity 
according to a different order thus appears to have the same goal as 
those who defend a ‘rational’ theological anthropology (i.e. the fully- 
fledged theory of pure nature and twofold finality), namely to offer an 
answer to the problem of theodicy or the ‘justification of God’. 
Driedo’s answer is that God is free to give to those he has already 
granted the great blessing of earthly life, the even greater blessing of 
eternal life, which is a supernatural good.
This answer poses a serious problem, however, one to which de 
Lubac has already alluded30. According to Driedo, the hypothetically 
pure natural state of the human person is equal to the state in which 
the human person is now bom, the state of (sinful) fallen nature. Bear 
ing in mind that the human person (theologically speaking) is ulti 
mately created by God in order to be happy with Him but is unable to 
achieve this goal when left to his or her natural powers, he or she is 
thus of necessity unhappy when abandoned to his or her natural pow 
ers. Such a state can only lead to hell and damnation. For this reason, 
it is difficult to imagine that God would create human persons in a 
state in which human life is ultimately meaningless and absurd. One 
cannot claim in line with Driedo, therefore, that an unhappy and mean 
ingless human existence in such a natural state is a blessing and should 
be understood as a gift of God. Human nature can only be understood 
as ‘grace’ if it is not absurd. In line with Martin Luther and the other 
major Augustinian theologian of his day, Driedo insists on fidelity to
29 This work was also published posthumously by Ruard Tapper.
30 d e  L u b a c , Augustinisme, pp. 184-185: “ L ’hypothèse  im aginée par D riedo  
accuse une pensée peu réfléchie, inapte à concevoir la  liberté, m êm e divine, sinon 
sous les form es de l ’arb itraire” .
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Revelation, which teaches us that human persons are (now) no longer 
the same as God wanted them to be at creation. When he endeavours 
to conceive of a pure nature to be characterised as ‘good’ (as a grace), 
he can only think of fallen nature in its present state {‘natura ut nunc 
est'), in spite of his efforts to make sin an abstraction. Such an under 
standing of human nature does not solve the problem, rather it relo 
cates it. Instead of questioning the righteousness of a God who pun 
ishes people on account of the sin of their forefather Adam, he is now 
forced to question the goodness of a God who creates men and women 
only to hand them over to hell and damnation.
It is important to bear in mind in this regard that Driedo’s 
approach is strictly theological. His theory of natura pura avoids the 
abstract and speculative philosophical dimension found, for example, 
in Cajetan (and also in embryonic form in Thomas31). Driedo’s evident 
aversion to the overuse of philosophy has its roots in Augustine, who 
branded recourse to philosophy as a denial of the reality of original sin, 
which impinges on human reason. Driedo is thus obliged to adopt a 
radical, salvation-historical point of departure. As a theologian, he is 
interested in the state of human nature both in the present and prior to 
original sin. It is only against the background of these theological con 
cerns, whereby the notion ‘human nature’ is never approached as an 
abstract concept, that Driedo is able to distinguish between the two 
natures. His reflections on the idea of natura pura are rooted in Augus- 
tinian creation-theological preoccupations. In this sense, Driedo’s doc 
trine of pure nature differs radically from that of Cajetan. For Driedo, 
the suggestion of a double (positive) finality with respect to human 
existence is unthinkable. If human persons are not oriented towards 
God, they face eternal damnation.
3. Michael Baius
Michael Baius32 was bom in 1513 near the city of Ath, obtained 
his degree in the artes and theology at the university of Leuven and 
was appointed professor royal {professor regius) in Sacred Scriptures
31 A. Va n n e s t e , Saint Thomas et le problème du surnaturel, in ETL 64 (1988) 
348-370.
32 V. Gr o s s i , Bajus, Michael, in Theologische Realenzyklopàdie, Vol. V, 1979, 
pp. 133-137; F.W. B a u t z , Bajus Michael, Biographisch-Bibliographischen Kirchen-
lexikon, Band I (1990), 349-350; see also the website Verlag Traugott Bautz
(www.bautz.de~l. link Biographisch-Bibliographischen Kirchenlexikon Online, 
s.v. Bajus, Michael.
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in 1549. A year after his appointment, he became president of the 
Pope’s College where he demonstrated his skills as both president and 
teacher while continuing to be actively involved in pastoral work. The 
government valued his ability to counter the claims of the Reforma 
tion and appointed him as royal commissioner for the ‘general par 
don’33. In this capacity, he enjoyed the power to grant amnesty on 
behalf of the government to those who had compromised themselves 
with the doctrines and teachings of the reformers.
3.1. The condemnations o f Baius
In spite of Baius’ many qualities, a number of his colleagues at 
the faculty -  among them Ruard Tapper and Josse Ravesteyn34 -  were 
suspicious of his aversion to scholasticism, which had inspired him to 
develop his own conceptual framework, rooted for the most part in the 
Church Fathers and alien to the majority of scholastic theologians. From 
the 1560’s onwards, Baius was subject to consistent critique with respect 
to his highly Augustinian theology. Ravensteyn isolated fifteen con 
testable propositions from two of Baius published works and sent them 
to the universities of Alcala and Salamanca where they were condemned 
in 1565 and 1567. Division of this kind among Catholic theologians was 
a thorn in the flesh of Philip II, since it appeared to weaken Catholi 
cism’s position. For this reason he insisted that Rome provide a solution 
in order to bring a speedy end to the dispute. Other colleagues at the fac 
ulty of theology were likewise of the opinion that Baius had gone too 
far and invited the king to submit the matter to the Roman authorities. 
Philip agreed to their request, as did Archbishop Granvelle of Meche 
len. On October 1st, Pius V promulgated a bull inspired by the censor 
ship activities of the Spanish inquisition entitled Ex omnibus affliction 
ibus in which 79 of Baius’ propositions were condemned.
The bull was first presented to Baius in person and then to a 
closed group of professors at the faculty of theology. Baius’ immedi 
ate submission does not suggest that he considered himself to have
33 Detailed information can be found in V. So e n , Geen pardon zonder paus! 
Studie over de complementariteit van het koninklijk en pauselijk generaal pardon 
(1570-1574) en over generaal inquisiteur Michael Baius (1560-1576) (Verhandelin 
gen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor Wetenschappen en Kun 
sten), Brussels, in preparation.
34 W. T r o x l e r , Ravesteyn Josse, in Biographisch-Bibliographischen Kirchen 
lexikon, Band VII (1994), 1422-1424; see also the website Verlag Traugott Bautz 
(www.bautz.de). link Biographisch-Bibliographischen Kirchenlexikon Online, 
s.v. ‘Ravesteyn, Josse’; and M. L a m b e r ig t s , Ravesteyn, Josse, in Lexikon fur The 
ologie undKirche, Band VIII (1999), col. 862-863.
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been unjustly treated. He nevertheless addressed a letter of protest to 
Pius V, who answered in 1569 that the Leuven professor should rec 
oncile himself with the situation. Once again Baius submitted. In the 
same year, the faculty published the bull in an endeavour to suppress 
rumours that the entire faculty of theology had been subject to con 
demnation. In spite of its ups and downs, Baius’ career does not seem 
to have suffered from the affair. In 1575, he became dean of the chap 
ter of St Peter’s Church.
When Gregory XIII promulgated the condemnatory bull for a 
second time in 1580 (included word for word in his Provisionis nos 
trae), Baius and the faculty submitted for a third time. To counter the 
still lively rumour mill, the faculty charged one of its senior profes 
sors, Johannes Lensaeus35, with the task of compiling a Corpus Doc 
trinae36, intended to determine the position of the faculty on the diffi 
cult questions of grace and nature, predestination and free will. The 
manifesto was approved unequivocally by the entire faculty in 1586 
and remained free of condemnation by Rome or another theological 
faculty. Michael Baius died three years later and was buried in the 
chapel of the Pope’s College, of which he was president to the day of 
his death. In the following pages we will review some of the core 
aspects of Baius’ thought.
3.2. The Doctrine o f Grace: Protestant and Pelagian perspectives37
In his book Surnaturel™, Henri de Lubac accuses Baius of devel 
oping an overly legalistic theology. His critique brings us immediately 
to the very core of the Baianistic conceptual world. De Lubac’s accu 
sation is related to Baius’ doctrine of justification, or more precisely, 
to his description of the human person in statu iustitiae, as elaborated 
in his De primi hominis iustitia and De virtutibus impiorum. Baius 
interprets the concept iustitia in the first instance as ‘the human state 
of obedience to the law and strict observance of God’s commandments
35 M. GffiLis, Lensaeus (de Lens) Johannes, in Lexikonfür Theologie und Kirche, 
Vol. 6 (1997) col. 813.
36 The Corpus doctrinae has its roots in Pope Gregory XIITs determination to 
settle the various disputes surrounding Baianism. The pope encouraged Johannes Fran- 
ciscus Bononi, nuntius of Cologne and Johannes Hauchin, Archbishop of Mechelen, 
to involve themselves in the matter and they in turn exhorted the faculty to compile 
the corpus. See E.J.M. v a n  Edl, La controverse louvaniste autour de la grâce et du 
libre arbitre à la fin du XVIe siècle, in L a m b e r ig t s  (éd.), L ’augustinisme, p. 215.
37 Cf. A. V a n n e s te , Nature et grâce dans la théologie de Baius, in E.J.M. V an  
Eijl (éd.), Facultas S. Theologiae; pp. 327-350.
38 H. d e  L u b a c , Surnaturel. Études historiques (Théologie, 8), Paris, 1946.
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with which charity ultimately coincides’. Both before and after the fall
-  supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism converge on this point in 
‘Baianism’ -  iustitia proprie dicta consists of the meticulous fulfil 
ment of the commandments. The human person can only be justified 
and thereby attain salvation by observing the commandments in the 
presence of the Creator. In line with Augustine, Baius maintains that 
such merits are only possible thanks to a divine gift of grace, whereby 
the liberum arbitrium is brought into harmony with the divine will. 
One can only speak of iustitia on the basis of an a priori gift offered 
by God. In the last analysis, therefore, the human person needs the 
grace of Christ as the conditio sine qua non for human merit. Up to 
this point, Baius would be likely to receive the approval of all Catholic 
theologians. Nevertheless, Baius maintains that human nature has been 
injured and weakened by the fall to such a degree that it also needs 
God’s grace to behave ‘naturally’ (ethically, humanly, with dignity). 
He thus creates the impression that the human person has a right to the 
grace necessary to act according to his or her nature and that God as 
Creator of the said nature is obliged, as it were, to grant such grace. 
For de Lubac, the idea that the human person can lay claim to grace 
and has the right to salvation (as completion of his or her nature) is 
one of the most objectionable elements of Baius’ theology39.
Baius’ ideas concerning human merit and human freedom are 
indeed surprising to a certain extent and can only be correctly understood 
within their anti-Protestant polemical context, which is particularly 
nuanced where Baius is concerned. Instead of being part of the throng 
of theologians who dismissed the ideas of Protestantism en masse, Baius 
exhibits a genuine desire to enter into the debate and even accepts a 
number of Protestantism’s basic intuitions. His theology is an endeav 
our to return to Augustinianism, following thus in the footsteps of 
Driedo. He nevertheless rejects the idea that the liberum arbitrium had
39 De Lubac even resurrects the old accusation that Baius was a Pelagian. If the 
human person, according to a ‘classical’ Pelagian, can assert his or her right to sal 
vation before God on the basis of his or her own works, which have a meritorious char 
acter without any prior sanctification or justification by God, then the same human per 
son, according to the ‘juridicising’ pelagian Baius can assert his or her claim to 
salvation because God is obliged to ensure that human nature maintains its integrity 
or has it restored. On the other hand, de Lubac himself was accused of Pelagianism, 
since he challenged the doctrine of pure nature. De Lubac insists, however, that there 
is no question of a claim emanating from the human person as such, but rather an ‘exi 
gence divine’, the fulfilment of a claim to which God is obliged to himself and not to 
the human person. The present authors would be inclined to include Baius here. It is 
thus clear that according to Baius any so-called claim on the part of the human per 
son to grace and salvation should be understood in a particularly restrictive sense.
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the capacity to keep God’s commandments even after the fall (in spite 
of the consuetudo peccandi stemming from the sin of Adam). He argues 
on the basis of the Bible and the Church Fathers -  thus sharing common 
ground with Protestantism at the level of methodology -  that human 
nature is truly and radically (i.e. to its roots) corrupt. In its fallen state, 
the liberum arbitrium is no longer able to do good of itself40.
Baius also differs with Protestantism, however, especially with 
respect to the potential restoration of fallen humanity. He considered 
the Protestant idea of the non-imputation of sin after justification to be 
inadequate41. In his opinion, and thanks to Christ’s grace that should 
be understood as a genuine gift, the capacity to do good was effec 
tively restored. For Protestants, iustificatio was separate from sancti 
ficatio, while for Baius they coincided. Salvation for Baius thus rep 
resented an intrinsic justification. This must also be understood 
correctly. For Baius, grace did not have an ontological character (as 
was the case with respect to the scholastic doctrine of grace with its 
distinction between gratia increata and gratia creata -  as well as gra 
tia sanctificans). Baius understands grace rather as an animi motus, 
which can also be described as adiutorium42.
3.3. Baius and pure nature
What is the significance of Baius’ understanding of grace for 
our understanding of pure nature? Baius clearly agrees with Driedo to 
the extent that he takes Adam’s original sin as the departure point of 
this theology. Both theologians then adjoin the necessity of redemption 
by Christ. It is not surprising, therefore, that Baius refers in the pref 
ace to his De peccato originis to Augustine, according to whom human 
history is embodied in the narrative of two people: one through whom 
all people have been placed under the yoke of sin and one through 
whom all people have been liberated from sin43. The theological
40 “Quod liberam arbitrium hominis, quale nunc est, ex se neque bonum facere 
possit, neque tentationem ullam superare. ” Quoted according to Va n n e s t e , Nature et 
grâce dans la théologie de Baius, p. 333.
41 At the risk of generalising, one could describe the Protestant vision as a changed 
attitude on God’s part with respect to the human person. The latter remains a sinner 
nevertheless.
42 This offers a good example of the difference in terminology employed in the 
scholastic theological discourse and that employed by Baius, who borrowed his con 
cepts from the reflections of the Church Fathers, in particular Augustine.
43 A. A u g u s tin u s , De gratia Christi et de peccato originali, R.24 : “in causa duo 
rum hominum quorum per unum venundati sumus sub peccato, per alterum redimimur
a peccato”.
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status of the contemporary human person is resolutely determined by 
the radical change brought about in human nature by original sin, a 
change that brings about an absolute need for grace. When we read 
Baius, we should understand every statement about grace in relation to 
the fall and to redemption. In like fashion to that of Driedo, Baius’ the 
ology of grace is radically salvation-historical in conception44.
When we examine Baius’ explanation of original justification at 
closer quarters, restoration and the corruption of human nature would 
appear to be correlated. Reference to restoration requires an existing 
state of corruption, and corruption in its turn engenders an expectation 
of restoration. Legitimate allusion to the corruption of human nature 
presupposes that there is true evil. The fall has to be taken seriously. 
This is exactly what Baius attempts to do when he defines the vitium 
originis as naturalium privatio bonorum. This definition is of crucial 
importance. Baius’ definition of the vitium originis âs naturalium pri 
vatio bonorum implies that the original or supralapsarian justification 
of the human person was not a supplementary grace. There can be no 
question of and additional gift of grace, bestowed on human nature in 
its paradisiacal state, as a consequence of which original sin disap 
peared. With this in mind, it becomes possible to make an abstraction 
of grace and speak of a pure human nature, exclusive of the additional 
gift of grace. In other words, this would imply a theory of natura pura. 
From this perspective, Baius’ reaction against Pelagianism -  which 
was related to a reaction against the distinction between nature and 
the supernatural generally accepted in post-Tridentine Catholic theol 
ogy -  becomes more accessible. If one considers the grace of the 
unfallen state to be supplementary, additional to an already intact 
human nature, and maintains that the latter disappears with original 
sin, then one can argue that human nature remains intact, even after 
the fall. Sin is not taken seriously, and as a consequence the concept 
of grace remains an ‘empty box’.
For Baius this implies de facto Pelagianism, since the conse 
quences of the fall are minimalisée! in such a vision to the loss of some 
thing that the human person does not need to be complete45. For the 
Leuven magister, by contrast, original sin was an authentic actus vicio- 
sus, whereby human nature was fundamentally damaged. Baius had
44 See in this regard V. Gr o s s i , Peccato e grazia nell’antropologia di Baio, in 
Augustinianum 8 (1968) 69ff.
45 Baius alludes to a “nudam iustitiae originalis, in qua naturaliter a Deo conditi 
sumus, privationem”. Cfr. V a n n e s t e , Nature et grâce dans la théologie de Baius, 
p. 334.
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exhibited the same anti-Pelagian concerns as his teacher Driedo in his 
anti-Erasmian stance. Yet, at the same time he rejects the natura pura 
doctrine as Pelagian46. In this sense, he distances himself remarkably 
enough from Driedo. In contrast to other scholastics, Driedo had arrived 
at this doctrine of pure nature on the basis of biblical and Augustinian 
propositions rather than philosophical speculation based on Aristotelian 
entelechism. In addition, however, he maintained the old hypothesis of 
a single, unique finality in which both nature and grace are oriented 
towards the visio beatifica. It is not impossible that Baius considered 
this to be contradictory. Baius likewise took biblical and Augustinian 
conceptual frameworks as his point of departure. Indeed, in terms of 
methodology he was even more radical than his teacher and rejected 
elements of his theology in which he detected concessions to a form of 
Pelagianism that must have been inherent, to scholasticism.
4. Baius’ theological anthropology and the Catholic tradition
To conclude our brief study of Baius we will endeavour to deter 
mine the source of the radicality with which he developed his theo 
logical ideas. Vanneste points out that a correct understanding of 
Baius’ Christian anthropology47 requires seeing it as a radicalisation of 
the Augustinian idea of the natura viciata48, and thus of the classical 
hypothesis that sin brings about a degree of injury in the human per 
son. This completely legitimate Christian biblical hypothesis acquires 
a disproportionate importance in Baius’ system. He radicalises it in a 
twofold manner, first by making the idea of a per se corrupt human 
nature the basis of his theology, and second by introducing such a far- 
reaching definition of corruption. This can be illustrated on the basis 
of a closer consideration of the liberum arbitrium.
For Baius, the free will of the fallen human person differed radi 
cally from that of Adam. Adam was granted a natura sana at creation and 
possessed, as ‘part’ thereof, a free will that was capable of inducing good
46 See in this regard  M.W.F. S to n e , Michael Baius (1513-1589) and the Debate 
on ‘Pure Nature’. Grace and Moral Agency in Sixteenth Century Scholasticism, in 
J. K r a y e  & R. S a a r in e n  (eds.), Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity 
(The N ew  Synthesis H isto rical L ibrary , 57), K luw er, D ordrech t, 2005, pp. 51-90.
47 In spite of its age, J.P. V a n  D o o r e n , Michael Baius. Zijn leer over de mens 
(Van Gorcum’s theologische bibliotheek, 29), Assen, Van Gorcum, 1958, continues 
to be informative in this regard.
48 Vanneste notes that Baius holds an incorrect interpretation of Augustine’s
natura vitiata, arguing that one would do the classical hypothesis more justice by
accepting that corruption is the consequence of sin, which remains secondary. Human
nature is injured thereby and human freedom is reduced.
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works. If Adam had remained in this state, he would have been able to 
lay claim to salvation and reward with justification, but he disobeyed and 
all of human nature became corrupt as a result. In order to corrupt human 
nature as such, Baius maintains, sin did not bring about the loss of some 
thing incidental. It would be wrong to argue, for example, that a child is 
bom in a state of sin. Rather one must say that a child comes into the 
world with an a priori corrupt nature. Baius’ goal here is the formal con 
firmation that every person is fundamentally sinful. For Baius, by con 
trast, human nature as it was before the fall disappears and freedom in 
its entirety is lost. In his opinion, sin not only brings about the loss of 
something added to human nature, but also the damaging of human nature 
as such (privatio naturalium bonorum). This demonstrates once again 
that one cannot speak of natura pura in regard to Baius49. The particu 
larity of his position is to be found in the radical extent of the corruption 
to which nature is liable on account of sin.
4. Robert Bellarmine
Robert Bellarmine50 was bom in Montepulciano in the Italian 
region of Tuscany on October 4th 1542. Under the guidance of his 
uncle, Cardinal Cervini, he was introduced to the Latin and Greek clas 
sics and he commenced his study of the artes in 1560 at the Jesuit run 
Roman College. One of his professors was Frans of Toledo, who was 
associated with Molinism. After studying the artes, Bellarmine inter 
rupted his curriculum in order to find his way in everyday life. From 
1567 to 1568 he taught rhetoric at Mondovi, where he started to 
explore theology as an autodidact.
1. Bellarmine and Leuven51
In the middle of the 16th century, the Jesuits established a resi 
dence in Leuven that enjoyed the support of professors such as Ruard
49 V a n n e s te , Nature et grâce dans la théologie de Baius, p. 337: “Pour qu’il y 
ait vraie corruption il faut que la nature ait perdu son intégrité, la perte d’un surajouté, 
même très précieux, ne suffit pas. Une nature qui a conservé sa santé et sa bonté 
naturelles n’est pas une nature corrompue”.
50 G. G a le o ta ,  Belarmino, Roberto, in O ’N e i l l  & D om inguez (éd.), Diccionario 
historico, Vol. I, pp. 387-390; B a u tz ,  Bellarmin, Robert, Biographisch-Bibli 
ographischen Kirchenlexikon, Band I (1990), 473-474; see also the website Verlag 
Traugott Bautz (www.bautz.de). link Biographisch-Bibliographischen Kirchenlexikon 
Online, s.v. ‘Bellarmin, Robert’.
51 Cf. L. C eyssens, Bellarmin et Louvain, in L am b erig ts  (éd.), L ’augustinisme, 
pp. 179-205.
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Tapper and Martinus Rythovius. Bellarmine was sent to Leuven in the 
spring of 1569 after completing his third year of theology in Padua52 
and quickly settled into his new home where he was to give lessons 
to the Leuven Jesuits and complete his own studies. He also estab 
lished something of a name for himself as a preacher. The young Jesuit 
received the tonsure, the minor ordinations and the sub-diaconate in a 
single ceremony on February 9th 1570 in Liege. Three weeks later he 
was ordained deacon and priest by the bishop of Ghent Cornelius 
Jansenius (1568-1576). Little can be said with certitude about the 
remainder of his theological formation in Leuven, beyond the fact that 
he followed classes at the Collegium Trilinguae with a view to sharp 
ening his classical language skills.
When Bellarmine arrived in Leuven, Michael Baius had already 
been branded a theologian suspected of heterodox opinions. The papal 
pull Ex omnibus afflictionibus had been promulgated, and while the 
content thereof was still unknown, the turbulent situation at the faculty 
of theology would not have slipped his notice. While it is probable 
that Bellarmine already distanced himself in his own theology classes 
from the positions maintained by Baius, there are no indications of a 
direct controversy between the two53. During his stay in Leuven, Bel 
larmine seems to have been particularly Augustinian in his thinking, 
not differing to any great degree from the theological positions of the 
Leuven School. In 1570-1571, he vehemently disagreed with theolo 
gians who maintained an ‘auxilium sufficiens’, which became a ‘gra 
tia efficax’ in conformity with the ‘liberum arbitrium’54. This is 
entirely in line with Augustine, and even exhibits an element of kin 
ship with Baianism. It would appear that Bellarmine immersed him 
self from the outset in the Augustinian atmosphere that dominated in 
Leuven. In 1573, he applied his vision for the first time to the posi 
tions that would later be considered Jesuit theology. Three years later, 
Bellarmine left Leuven once again after a planned stay of seven years. 
It was only after his departure from the city that he came to distance
52 On Bellarmine’s earlier theological training and the development of his ideas, 
see a.o. M. B ie r s a c k , Initia Bellarminiana. Die Prâdestinationslehre bei Robert 
Bellarmin SJ bis zu seiner Löwener Vorlesungen 1570-1576 (Historische Studien in 
Auftrag der Historischen Kommission der Wissenschaften und der Literatur Mainz, 
15), Stuttgart, Steiner, 1989.
53 See M. Bie r s a c k , Bellarmin und die 'Causa Baii’, in L a m b e r ig t s  (ed.), L ’au- 
gustinisme, p. 176: “Bellarmin kam nicht nach Löwen um gegen Baius zu streiten. 
Zumindest die Löwener hatten keinen Eindruck von einer polemischen Haltung des 
Jesuiten gegen Sie”.
54 B ie rsa c k , Bellarmin und die ‘Causa Baii’, pp. 171-173.
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himself more openly from the deviant Augustinianism of Baius. This 
later rejection of Baianism will constitute the focus of the following 
paragraph.
2. Bellarmine’s polemic with Baius
Bellarmine’s rejection of Baianism did not hark back to the 
moderate vision of the natura viciata, according to which human 
nature is only corrupt to a certain degree {aliquo modo). In contrast, 
the later to be canonised Bellarmine provided a highly systematic 
analysis of the supernatural character of original justification. In his 
best known work De controversiis Christianae fid e i -  which should 
be situated in the context of anti-Protestant polemic in line with the 
works of Baius -  Bellarmine clearly states what he believes to be 
the Catholic position with regard to two heresies, namely Pelagian 
ism and Lutheranism: “Catholic theologians are convinced that 
Adam was granted many supernatural gifts at creation. Through 
Adam’s sin, however, all humanity experienced degradation. Never 
theless, while the supernatural gifts were lost, free will and the other 
natural gifts remained intact”55. Bellarmine endeavours to escape 
both heterodox positions by stating unequivocally that original jus 
tification was a supernatural gift that was lost in the fall, leaving 
humanity in a state of degradation. Humanity’s natural possibilities, 
however, remained unaffected. Bellarmine clearly adopts a com 
pletely different stance to that of Baius on the extent of humanity’s 
corrupt state brought about by Adam’s sin. Where Baius radicalised 
the Augustinian notion of the natura viciata  in a twofold manner, 
Bellarmine deprives the latter of all content. The only corruption to 
be spoken of is the loss of supernatural gifts56. The passage we have 
examined, therefore, is not only against Protestantism, but equally 
against Baius. This becomes evident at the end of the said chapter of 
De controversiis christianae fidei where Bellarmine quotes the papal 
bull of 1567 to the letter.
55 B e lla rm in u s ,  Controversiae: “Porro Catholici Doctores, qui multis supemat- 
uralibus donis primum nostrum parentem initio creationis omatum fuisse non dubitant, 
duos ullos errores (Pelagianism and Lutheranism) sine ulla difficultate declinant. 
Docent enim, per Adae peccatum totum hominem vere deteriorem esse factum; et 
tamen nec liberum arbitrium, neque alia naturalia dona, sed solum supematuralia per 
didisse”. Cf. V a n n e s te , Nature et grâce dans la théologie de Baius, p. 342.
56 According to Bellarmine: “supematuralium bonorum privatio”. According to 
Baius, one should speak of a “naturalium bonorum privatio”, whereby human nature 
became completely and fundamentally corrupt.
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3. Bellarmine and the natura pura
It will be apparent from what we have said so far that Bellaraiine 
accepts the notion of a natura pura. As a matter of fact, he describes the 
state of original justification in terms of a surplus of grace. In his opin 
ion, only this surplus was lost as a result of original sin. In rejecting 
Baius, he explicitly presupposes that God could have created humanity 
for a goal other than the beatific vision in order to demonstrate that grace 
is a ‘supernatural’ gift. Bellarmine thus speaks in this regard of a pure 
natural state, which enjoys only a hypothetical character and never 
existed in reality. For him there is only one genuine order and that is the 
supernatural order, since humanity was created in reality to be happy in 
and with God. As a consequence, humanity is to be characterised on the 
basis of its ‘desiderium naturale ad visionem beatificam'. Bellarmine 
thus remains in line with the Leuven augustinian School57.
In his reflections on the said state of pure nature, however, 
Bellarmine points out that this can also be compared with the situation 
of non-believers: if one makes abstraction of sin itself (and thus of 
grace!), the human person in a state of fallen nature does not differ in 
any way from the human person in a state of pure nature. To use 
Bellarmine’s image, they differ from one another as a naked person 
differs from a person who has been robbed of all his clothing58. 
Bellarmine thus considers himself obliged to explore the significance 
of the life of a non-believer who has not received sanctifying grace and 
consequently does not share in salvation. Bellarmine is of the opinion 
that the life of a person should not be considered absurd because God 
has withheld the means necessary to achieve the beatific vision59. As 
with Cajetan (and ultimately Thomas ! ), such ideas locate Bellarmine’s 
image of the human person more in the philosophical world than the
57 Cf. H. R o n d e t , Le problème de la nature pure et la théologie du XVIe siècle, 
m Recherches de science religieuse 35 (1948) 481-521; p. 516. According to Rondet, 
Bellarmine was “trop augustinien encore pour se faire une haute idée d’une fin pure 
ment naturelle. Pour lui l ’esprit se définit par son rapport avec Dieu possédé face à 
face”.
58 B e lla rm in u s ,  Controversiae, c. V, 12: “non magis differt status hominis post 
lapsum, quam differat spoliatus a nudo; neque deterior est humana natura, si culpam 
originalem detrahas, neque magis ignorantia, et infirmitate laborat, quam esset, et 
laboret in puris naturalibus condita. Proinde corruptio naturae, non ex alicujus doni 
naturalis carentia, neque ex alicujus malae qualitatis accessu, sed ex sola doni super- 
naturalis ob Adae peccatum amissione profluxit”.
59 B e lla rm in u s , Controversiae. De gratia primi hominis, c. 7 : “Aequum omnino
fuisse ut Deus homini ad talem finem tam sublimem ordinato, media necessaria non 
negaret; tamen nihil absurdum secuturum, si negasset”. Cf. R o n d e t , Problème, 
p. 515 and d e  L u b a c , Augustinisme, p. 191.
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theological world. By incorporating this philosophical perspective in 
his doctrine of pure nature, he succeeds in solving the problem that 
arose as a result of Driedo’s hypothesis of pure nature.
Bellarmine’s theological anthropology is subject to considerable 
tension because it endeavoures to combine several traditions. In certain 
places he describes the human person as he or she now is, a being with 
a wounded nature that is characterised by a natural desire to see God. 
In other places, however, he speaks of the state of pure nature, which 
he views from a philosophical perspective and more or less equates 
with the situation of non-believers. In his efforts to counter Lutheranism 
and Pelagianism, Bellarmine thus places himself in a ‘Baianist’ light, 
maintaining a position that ought to be described as ‘Pelagianising’. 
Bellarmine’s stance likewise accords with the work of Driedo, specif 
ically where the latter differed so radically from his student Baius, 
namely in his formulation of the hypothesis of the state of pure nature.
Based on our analysis of the reception of Driedo by Baius and 
Bellarmine, it might be plausible to argue that the conflict between 
these two theologians60 already had its roots in nucleo in Driedo’s 
work. In reaction to Erasmus’ (semi-)Pelagianism, Driedo developed 
a theory on the state of pure nature and thereby drew critical attention 
to the problem of the salvation or meaning of the life of those who find 
themselves outside the order of grace. His student Baius rejected the 
doctrine of pure nature, but was left with a dilemma: strict Augus- 
tinianism, in which human nature is seen as so corrupt that it becomes 
necessary to consider non-believers as condemned to hell, and a new 
form of Pelagianism in which humanity is considered capable of 
demanding salvation from God in order to preserve or restore the 
integrity of human nature. Bellarmine solves the problem by integrat 
ing Cajetan’s philosophical understanding of the human person into 
Driedo’s doctrine of pure nature. In so doing, however, he took an 
important step in the direction of the theology of the modem period, 
which recognises a dual finality for human existence.
Conclusions
An initial conclusion to be drawn from our research is that all 
lovanienses -  certainly from the time of the students of Adrian of
60 More information in this regard can be found, for example, in V. Gr o s s i, Due 
interpreti di San Agostino nelle questioni del sopranaturale. Michele Baio, Roberto 
Bellarmino, in Augustinianum 6 (1966) 203-225.
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Utrecht (Latomus, Driedo, Tapper) -  appear once again to share a sin 
gle characteristic feature: a passion for Augustine and a correlative 
aversion to Pelagianism, with which each of them contended in his 
own manner. This Augustinianism lead Driedo to criticise scholastic 
theology with its Aristotelian roots. Spurred on by his teacher Adrian, 
Driedo revealed a preference for a more ‘modem’ positive theology, 
taking the Scriptures and Augustine as its point of departure and as its 
theological sources. While Driedo nevertheless made room for the 
scholastic tradition in his Augustinian theology, however, Baius pres 
ents us with a theology focused one-sidedly on Augustine. Rooted in 
his Leuven background, Baius’ major critic Robert Bellarmine was 
also extremely Augustinian, although he allowed for the input of 
scholasticism to an even greater degree than Driedo. This lead to a 
more balanced theology, which aligned itself seamlessly with Leu 
ven’s ‘doctrina augustiniano-scholastica’, as it can be found in 
Johannes Lensaeus’ Corpus doctrinae, for example.
A second conclusion is that not all Leuven theologians shared 
a single interpretation of Augustine’s ideas. On the basis of his own 
interpretation, Driedo was able to accept the theory of a hypothetical 
pura natura. His student Baius, on the other hand, opposed Driedo on 
the very issue of the natura pura, which was nevertheless followed by 
Bellarmine. The latter associated the notion of a hypothetical state of 
pure nature in which God could have created humanity but did not, 
with the philosophical speculations of Cajetan -  fully in line with 
Thomas Aquinas -  on the possibility of the human person ‘in puris nat 
uralibus’, considered from the perspective of his or her nature alone, 
detached from any Christian theological perspective. In so doing, the 
doctor of the church Robert Bellarmine adopted a position that ran 
radically counter to that of Michael Baius.
As a final conclusion we can observe that theory of a hypothet 
ical pure nature did not originate in Bellarmine’s opposition to Baius, 
but rather in Driedo’s critique of Erasmus. This has far reaching con 
sequences for the interpretation of the theory in question, which Pius 
XII defended -  against de Lubac’s ideas? -  in the encyclical Humani 
generis in 1950.
Karim S c h e l k e n s  & Marcel G t et .t s
PLATONIC MYTH AND THE BEGETTING OF THE 
DIVINE LOGOS IN EGIDIO OF VITERBO, OJE.S.A
Articulation of the dogmas of the Christian faith began in the 
context of Hellenistic Judaism. John’s Gospel’s description of Chris 
tianity’s principal doctrine, that of God the Father’s begetting of a 
divine Son, Jesus, God who was with God “in the beginning” is an ele 
gant expression of the teaching that Jesus is not only the historical 
Messiah of Judaism but is also the preexistent Logos and eternally 
divine. The description is vague, however, from the standpoint of the 
philosophical tradition of discussions about change and will and neces 
sity, ideas intimately connected with the act of generation or begetting. 
As Christianity moved deeper into the sphere of Hellenistic culture, 
Christian thinkers responded to that philosophical tradition to which 
Christianity was then linked. The philosophical legacy of dicussions 
of change entered early into Christian theological writings. In the third 
century Origen of Alexandria observed in his treatise On Prayer that 
inanimate things are moved of necessity, that is, as the effect of an 
external cause, what the later tradition labeled ex agente. Animate 
things may move by their own nature ex se in response to external 
causes, rational beings are also moved by necessity and nature but also 
by their own will per se.1 Origen is here in a defense of the efficacy 
of prayer employing distinctions about change in various beings that 
were first articulated in Plato’s Phaedrus and which are later expressed 
in Aristotle and then by the Stoics, namely that change is a kind of 
motion that entails a cause, but the causes are different for different 
types of things. And we find in Carneades a discussion of the role of 
the free will as a cause of motion in human beings. Begetting is an act, 
a change, a motus. But how is one to understand the act of begetting 
in the eternal God? Is acknowledgement of God’s begetting of an off 
spring an admission of mutability in God? Does God beget willingly? 
If not, was God then unwilling, or coerced, to beget the Son? But if 
God does will to act in begetting a divine son, then it may seem that 
a movement of God’s will preceded the act of begetting.
Those questions are rooted in the controversy which brought the 
desire to gain consensus on the matter of divine generation to the fore 
front and which affected virtuallly every aspect of Christian thought 
and worship. Among all Christians there was a conviction that the Son
1 De oratione, 6.1.
